“Czechia has no ambitions to shape EU policy on the South Caucasus” Ondřej Soukup in an interview with Caliber.Az

In an interview with Caliber.Az, Czech Radio (Český rozhlas) commentator and political analyst Ondřej Soukup outlines Prague’s evolving approach to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where energy security, business cooperation and bilateral engagement are increasingly taking precedence over broader geopolitical ambitions.

Soukup discusses the drivers behind Czech-Azerbaijani relations, the limits of EU-level energy policy, and Prague’s pragmatic foreign policy outlook under Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, highlighting how economic diplomacy is shaping Czechia’s engagement with the wider region.

– Prime Minister of Czechia Andrej Babiš’s visit to Azerbaijan addressed cooperation in various fields. In addition to negotiations in the energy sector, it was somewhat surprising that Prague and Baku are also ready to develop cooperation in the military sphere and other areas. Which of the most important aspects of this range of proposals would you highlight?

– The leitmotif of this visit and of the Czech side’s interests is undoubtedly cooperation in the energy sector. That is, if we take into account that Czechia purchases 42 per cent of all its oil from Azerbaijan, it becomes clear that interest in this area with Baku is enormous.

This also concerns new gas supplies. The Czech Minister of Industry emphasised that in Baku, they will definitely discuss gas deliveries and not only that. Thus, energy issues are the main driver of visits not only to Azerbaijan but also to Kazakhstan.

As for the military sphere, I would like to note that Czech defence companies began cooperating with Azerbaijan as far back as ten years ago. Much of that equipment took part in the fighting during the 44-day war and received positive evaluations.

There is a clear focus on private business strategies: representatives of around 50 companies arrived in Azerbaijan together with Prime Minister Babiš, and the range of cooperation issues was very broad. A business forum was held as part of the visit, with their participation. For example, it is known that Czech companies intend to take part in the tender for the supply of carriages for the Baku Metro.

– As I understand it, Czechia generally welcomes Azerbaijan’s orientation towards energy cooperation with European countries in a bilateral format, without expecting any concrete global proposals from the EU leadership to expand such cooperation. Although rhetoric that Brussels values and needs Azerbaijani energy supplies has been voiced repeatedly. Baku has more than once noted that it is ready to work on expanding the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline network if the European Union guarantees the purchase of these additional gas volumes. However, progress on this issue has been very limited.

– I think that bilateral partnerships with individual European states are the most normal and rational format. The thing is that Brussels does not have its own funds to invest in such projects or act as a guarantor. It will also not take on the role of an entity that buys gas and distributes it among countries, functioning as a kind of distribution mechanism. However, it can do something else – politically support the intentions of private investors to conclude such deals with Baku, encourage such cooperation, the creation of gas or oil consortia, metaphorically pat them on the shoulder and say: here you go, “green light”. But it will not invest. That is also an important point to take into account.

– Europe is, of course, undergoing a reset of its political system amid global political turbulence. In particular, entire centres of power are stepping back from leading roles, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has oriented his policy, on the one hand, towards active cooperation with the United States and, on the other, towards dialogue with Russia. At the same time, Orbán has also advocated cooperation with the countries of the South Caucasus. What foreign policy strategy does today’s Czechia follow? Can it be characterised in any way?

– I would note that the Czech prime minister is, first and foremost, an excellent businessman, so one of the strategies of today’s Czechia is pragmatism and a clear understanding of its priorities, which are not tied to political considerations. At the same time, political ambitions, preferences and agendas have, in turn, played a significant role in the recent policies of a number of European countries and still sometimes serve as their hallmark.

Another feature is that Prime Minister Babiš’s coalition partners include, on the one hand, a party representing a kind of collection of Trumpist tendencies, and on the other hand, extreme populists and nationalists who are more inclined to listen to Moscow. So, contemporary Czech policy often involves balancing between different positions. In principle, most Czech political forces expect the current government to pursue a strong pragmatic policy focused primarily on economic diplomacy, and I think there will be no such high-profile statements as, for example, attending the Victory Day parade on Red Square on May 9, as the Slovak prime minister intends.

However, one should not expect any sharp turns against Moscow’s policy either. In other words, it seems to me that a pragmatic European mainstream policy will most likely be maintained here, because our role and participation in the European Union are indeed important to us. This is also combined with certain personal priorities of Prime Minister Babiš – as is known, he is the wealthiest person in Czechia, and his strategy is primarily focused on well-functioning business, a field in which he is very well-versed. All his companies operate in Western Europe, and he places great importance on maintaining good relations with Germany, France and other countries in the region, as well as ensuring that Czechia’s voice is heard in the European Commission in Brussels. At the same time, as far as I know, he has no business assets in Russia, nor any dependencies on Moscow. So this also leaves its mark on the foreign policy vectors of official Prague. 

As for everything else, I do not think that Czechia has any ambitions to be a “breakthrough” state, for example, to define the European Union’s policy towards the South Caucasus. The Czech Republic is simply focused on constructive economic partnership without excessive politicisation.

– How would you briefly characterise the economic strategy of Prime Minister Babiš’s “triple” visit?

– Azerbaijan is a leading partner, which, as I have already noted, provides almost half of Czechia’s oil needs. In turn, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are prospective future partners for energy supplies, for example, if it becomes possible to lay an oil pipeline across the bottom of the Caspian Sea. At the very least, Czechia is very interested in such a scenario.