How could the EU’s pivot to Central Asia challenge Russian influence? Re-asserting soft power in the immediate neighbourhood

2022 will go down in history as a profound crisis period in Russia – Western relations. Moscow's unprovoked war against Ukraine inevitably caused deep economic, diplomatic, and security crises across the globe. Of greater concern for Moscow, the war steadily decreased its role as the world's leading energy supplier of Europe and a main regional actor in the post-Soviet region. Hence, the waning influence of Russia in its immediate neighbourhood resulted in some countries, particularly Central Asian nations, distancing themselves from the Kremlin's current narratives and eyeing new partnerships.

As a result, actors like China, Türkiye, and recently the European Union attempted to establish a footprint in the energy-rich Central Asia. While Russia endeavours to rebuild the old empire through the brutal force and intimidation of smaller countries, the EU makes inroads into the region exclusively through a soft power strategy. Until now, the EU mostly prioritized the South Caucasus region and Ukraine, whereas Central Asia was absent from the top agenda. However, the growing global energy crisis pushed Europe to reach out to Central Asian states for potential energy cooperation, thus challenging Russia in its geopolitical backyard.

Geography limited the West's projection of power. So did Russia's centuries-old influence and, to a growing degree, China's ambitions. Nevertheless, the West is now a geopolitical rival of Moscow and, to some extent Beijing. According to the earlier data, China has invested an estimated €22.5 billion in Central Asia since the launch of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) versus a timid €1 billion of EU aid in 2020. With all its recent engagement, China has come to dominate four out of five countries' share of total foreign trade. There's nothing in the EU's strategy that will change this. Central Asian political elites benefit from the "ideological cushion" and limited strings that China attaches.

The situation began slightly shifting when regional states like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan switched foreign policy priorities to limit Moscow's and Beijing's influences while seeking deeper engagement with wealthy European nations. For example, Kazakhstan, one of the most important regional states, has opened its doors for a broader external expansion since President Kasym Jomart Tokayev assumed office in 2019.

Tokayev has consistently advocated for more openness and improving necessary conditions for attracting foreign business and investors to participate in various economic sectors, including the cultural and educational sectors. The most significant point about Tokayev's walk away from Russia and China is the recent decision to pump Kazakh oil to Europe amid an energy shortage.

Astana to increase the number of Kazakh oil exporters west across the Caspian Sea, avoiding Russia to the north. It currently relies heavily on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), one of the world's largest pipelines that cross Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. With the recent diplomatic tensions between the two neighbours, Kazakhstan will start pumping oil to Europe through Azerbaijan’s Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline from January 2023.

As of December 2022, Germany, a leading EU member state, expressed willingness to import Kazakh oil, though the lack of necessary infrastructure is a serious challenge. This is because Kazakh oil could be shipped to Germany only through Russia’s Druzhba network, complicating the issue. Notwithstanding, Germany still seemed deeply interested in replacing Russian exports with Kazakh oil.

The EU's intensive efforts to counter Russia in Central Asia could yield positive results, given its vast financial resources. In October 2022, European Council chief Charles Michel was in Astana to meet regional leaders in late October, a meeting he called “much more than just a policy dialogue between two regions.”

The EU’s chief diplomat, Joseph Borrell, visited the region again in late November, emphasizing the EU could be a suitable alternative for regional states amid Russia’s declining influence. Undoubtedly, the EU wants to engage with the region, and a massive €300 billion cost investment package within the Global Gateway infrastructure framework, is the bloc’s response to Russia and China-led investment projects in the region.

The EU has a good chance to boost its influence in Central Asia, as the regional nations are witnessing growing resentment against Russia shortly after its military intervention in Ukraine. Although it would take some time for the EU to ensure a strong presence in Central Asia, it is evident that Brussels takes this mission more seriously compared to its previous foreign policy strategy.

Russia's invasion has rekindled reminders of the wounds left by three centuries of brutal imperialist domination over former Soviet nations. Therefore, Central Asian countries do not have another viable option but to seek deeper cooperation with the West as a counterbalance to Russia's security leverage, which could grant additional security guarantees.