Zangazur Corridor: Points of contention Cogitative delineation of interim probability

The economic argument in favour of the multi-modal Zangazur mega-project is overwhelming. Evidence substantiating the prospective benefits are piling up daily and exponentially. Yet the present Baku-Yerevan discourse is of a legal-political nature, mainly concerning the specifics of a regime applicable to an overland passage uniting Azerbaijan’s mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave. 

Dichotomy revisited

Although it may appear that Yerevan is grudgingly yielding to what it believes to be Baku’s importunity, the current points of contention remain firmly riveted. The essence of the current Armenian protestation could be described as ‘extraterritoriality angst’, in other words, the concern that, if Article 9 of the 10 November 2020 trilateral declaration is fully implemented, the nation’s sovereignty over the portion of the land commensurate with the corridor will be curbed de facto.

This aforementioned concern has long been preying on the minds of the Armenian political classes and could be said to comprise, inter alia, three elements, which are by no means exhaustive. The first limb is to do with the question as to who will be exercising ‘control over transport’, or which country will guarantee the security of the passage.

Article 9 mandates in an unambiguous manner that this function is incumbent upon the Border Guard Services of the Russian Federal Security Service. It is evident that Baku does not want the passage to be controlled by Yerevan, which believes such an arrangement will amount to encroachment into its sovereignty.

Secondly, Azerbaijan insists that there should ideally be no or minimal checkpoints. Again, Armenia begs to differ, insisting on ordinary interstate arrangements militating against the ‘simplified exclusivity’ of the route.

Thirdly, there is a terminological discrepancy between the parties, with Azerbaijan deliberately and persistently resorting to the term ‘corridor’, with all of its concomitant implications, whereas Armenia finds the term unacceptable, tending to view the overland passage as a non-exclusive ingredient within the unblocking of communications agenda.

Balance of bargaining chips

The Zangazur project has its roots in the 10 November deal, and is Azerbaijan’s brainchild, wholeheartedly supported by Turkiye and perceived as a plausible notion by Russia. For Armenia, if denuded of its ‘corridor’ terminology, the idea may be deemed acceptable.

Tehran remains deeply perturbed, due to the altered geopolitics of the region, and despite the Memorandum of Understanding that envisions a communications route from the Eastern Zangazur Region to Nakhchivan via Iranian territory, signed with Baku in March 2020, Iran is still given to pangs of vexation.

Georgia has not yet expressed unequivocal support for the project, which could be explained by its fear of losing its role as an indispensable pivot in the wider East-West transport communications web.

Time is of the essence. Baku appears to be ready to steel itself for an arduous dispute, but also wants quick results and does not have an appetite for exacerbated obstreperousness. Some of those in Armenia appear to think that the vital aspect is to consistently reject the Azerbaijani proposal so as to be able to prevail later, at an unspecified juncture. This is exactly what the revenge-intoxicated and melancholically boisterous Russian-backed opposition has been preaching all along the way.

In Baku, there is a firm belief that the time bomb clock is ticking inexorably against Yerevan. Armenia's economic state is not envious. Pashinyan's government has been struggling to fill in the gaps torn in the economy and a new war with Azerbaijan would cast further aspersions on the viability of the Armenian state.

Armenia is not oblivious to the economic argument in favour of the corridor. In October 2021, for instance, some of the members of Pashinyan’s party opined positively on the economic benefits of the unblocking of communications, with a particular emphasis on the Nakhchivan route. Thereafter followed claims that the corridor was a red line to which Armenia would never stoop.

Armenian economist Vahe Davtyan believes that, if the project goes through, Yerevan will finally have a chance to be more than a transit country, becoming both an importer and consumer, and given that the internal legislation has already been liberalised accordingly, the potential benefits could easily be utilised within a short time frame.

In the context of bargaining chips, the comparative analysis of the Lachin and Zangazur corridors, as stipulated in Articles 6 and 9 of the trilateral declaration, form another area of contestation. Baku appears to be focused on the substantive content of the relevant provisions of the ceasefire deal, whereas Yerevan naturally favours a fuzzy interpretation based on "the corridor is what is called the corridor” formula.

Article 6, inter alia, stipulates that Azerbaijan "shall guarantee the safety of citizens, vehicles, and goods travelling along the Lachin Corridor in both directions". Article 9, on the other hand, states that Armenia "shall guarantee the safety of transport links between the western region of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan in order to organise the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and goods in both directions".

On balance, Azerbaijan is not attempting to seize control over any land to which it has no entitlement. Although the term 'corridor' is used neither in the 10 November 2020 ceasefire agreement, nor any other trilateral document, the purported meaning of Article 9 point is clear and principally no different from that encapsulated in Article 6.

In December 2021, President Aliyev stated that, if Yerevan refused to guarantee the overland passage in question, Baku would reconsider the regime of the Lachin Corridor: "If Armenia would insist on using customs facilities to control cargoes and people, then we will insist on the same in the Lachin Corridor. This is logical".

Transitionary concurrence

Azerbaijan's indefatigable determination over the Zangazur Corridor is intact. Armenia is recalcitrant and stubbornly refuses to accept what it calls 'corridor logic'. Therefore, principal concurrence on the gist has yet to be achieved. However, this is neither an impasse nor a stalemate.

The wheels are continuously in motion and there is a tentative framework based on achieving “a simplified regime without prejudicing Armenia’s sovereignty” in the interim.

Two considerations seem to guide the discussions on the nature of the legal regime pertaining to the route. It must provide a propitious condition for unhindered movement and should not entail any form of extraterritoriality, with the meaning of the term applicable to the situation on the ground left in a sufficiently fluid scope so as to be malleable for further specification at a later date.