How would Hamas's surprise attack on Israel inflame the Middle East? Repeating bad mistakes of the past

On October 7, Hamas launched a multipronged assault on southern Israel, killing hundreds of people and taking as many as 150 hostages. Israel responded with airstrikes that have also killed hundreds, a total blockade of the Gaza Strip, and a declaration of war.

So far, more than 1,600 people have been killed and thousands more wounded in the fighting. According to Israeli and Palestinian authorities, more than 900 Israelis and foreign nationals have been killed in Israel, and more than 700 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza and the West Bank.

As of October 11, the Israeli military said it had hit more than 2,300 “Hamas targets” to date in response to Saturday’s (October 7) deadly incursion by the militant group, while more than 4,500 rockets had been fired from Gaza. Moreover, for the third successive day, Israel shelled sites in Lebanon, its neighbour to the north — which is home to Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant movement, and large numbers of Palestinians — in response to a cross-border volley of rockets.

The current level of escalation risks spillover across the region with the involvement of an array of non-state actors. Israel’s decision to cut basic necessities such as water, electricity and food supplies in Gaza will likely provoke more reaction from Hamas and its sympathizers.

As such, the Israeli government’s recent decision to mobilize an unprecedented 300,000 reservists suggests that a wider ground invasion is in the cards. But while Israel has a considerable advantage in terms of the size of its military, technology, weapons systems and logistics, Hamas has adapted considerably over the years to take advantage of Gaza’s dense urban environment.

Since the brutal attack unfolded, Israel has mobilized some 300,000 reserve troops to deploy on two fronts: the Gaza border in the south and the Lebanese one in the north, home to Hezbollah and its massive rocket arsenal.

Hamas had several reasons to act. Hamas’s claims to political legitimacy depend on a combination of service provision in Gaza, where it is the de facto government and violent resistance to Israel. It differentiates itself from the Palestinian Authority (PA), which governs the West Bank, along both of these lines.

The current tactic of violent attacks is aimed at intimidating the state of Israel and forcing it to make unusual concessions. For this purpose, Hamas obtained Iran's direct support in terms of training, weaponry, and intelligence.

Nevertheless, Iran denies any role in orchestrating and perpetrating the action, citing the Palestinian people's right to self-defence. Iran is indeed Hamas' biggest funder ($70 million a year for Hamas, $30 million for Islamic Jihad), and it encourages it to carry out terrorist activity against Israel. In this regard, the ongoing conflict may soon turn into an open Israeli-Iran confrontation.

In the meantime, while building up its ground forces in the north and south, Israel's air force has bombed an unprecedented number of targets to house Hamas facilities and leaders' homes. Much of Gaza City's Rimal neighbourhood, the seat of the Hamas government and the enclave's financial centre has been turned into rubble.

As the sandy countryside turns into urban areas, the terrain gets more difficult for Israel. High-rise residential blocks in places such as Jabaliya and Beit Lahia overlook the northern approaches towards Gaza City, while the main north-south road is bordered by industrial areas Hamas has used defensively in the past.

Unlike previous years, namely the second intifada, Hamas now seemed to have a large stockpile of Kornet anti-tank missiles, which have been used effectively, including by Hezbollah in Lebanon, against Israeli main battle tanks.

For many years, Hamas gained core experience in fighting the IDF and was expertized in building large networks of tunnels and hardened and well-hidden underground locations to use as command centres and for deploying fighters.

Consequently, Israel has no good options in Gaza. No matter how disproportionate, the ongoing air strikes will probably not be seen as reestablishing deterrence or denying Hamas a major victory. A total blockade will also be insufficient to push Hamas out of Gaza.

Gaza is among the most densely populated places on earth, and urban assaults are among the most difficult and deadly of all operations a military can attempt. Therefore, the cost of ground operation is likely to be heavy for the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians, with the risk of Israeli hostages being held in the territory.