Russia — Georgia: Will a new transit route open? Race for the Middle Corridor

At first glance, despite claims by the pro-Western opposition that Georgia is allegedly governed by the "pro-Russian" party, Georgian Dream, no significant shifts in the warming of relations between Georgia and Russia are evident so far. On the contrary, following instructions from Moscow, separatist puppets have resumed their "independent" anti-Georgian rhetoric. In the occupied Tskhinvali, separatists announced the resumption of work on an agreement regarding the non-use of force "by Georgia" against the self-declared separatist entities—the so-called "South Ossetia" and Abkhazia. 

The Kremlin-appointed "President of Abkhazia," Badra Gunba, who was elected with the support of the Armenian community, demanded "recognition of the independence" of the separatist regime by Georgia, as well as the "signing of fundamental documents on the non-use of force." Among the Armenians themselves, "predictions" are circulating that Russia, having concluded a ceasefire in Ukraine, will "free up" forces for a more active policy in the Caucasus. Naturally, Armenian nationalists hope that Russia will first annex Abkhazia, effectively creating a sort of "Coastal Armenia" for their ethnicity, and eventually retake "Artsakh."

The situation in the world, with the actual start of U.S.-Russian negotiations for peace in Ukraine, is changing rapidly. With the help of the U.S., projects that the Russia-Ukraine war had stalled are beginning to "unblock," which could strengthen American influence in Europe. Specifically, the U.S. is negotiating with Russia and Germany to purchase the "Nord Streams" and other energy infrastructure to restore Russian energy supplies to Europe after the war in Ukraine ends. If the revival of the "Nord Streams" project with the U.S. succeeds, Washington's energy influence on the EU will be further strengthened. And as a "mediator" of a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, the U.S. will likely influence trade and transit flows through Russian territory to Europe, including from China.

Russia is also focused on cooperating with the U.S. in the Arctic. Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, who participated in the Russian-American negotiations on February 18 in Riyadh, stated that the discussions included the prospects for joint U.S.-Russian projects in the Arctic. China has also shown interest in the Arctic, but as a non-Arctic country, it intends to pursue its interests in this region through cooperation with Russia. In turn, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has directly expressed hope for the normalization of the Arctic Council’s activities. 

Notably, since March 2022, the Arctic Council, which includes Iceland, Canada, Norway, Russia, the U.S., Finland, and Sweden, has effectively been frozen due to the Ukrainian crisis. Apart from Russia, there are no other "pro-China" states in the Arctic Council, making it difficult for Beijing to defend its interests in the Arctic through this body. Hypothetically, Denmark, which owns Greenland, could consider China's interests as a counterclaim to Greenland, but in that case, the U.S. could simply push for a change in the status of Greenland.

Thus, among the promising routes for the transit of goods and resources through Eurasia, at least two (through Russian territory and the Arctic) are shaping up for Russian-American cooperation. While this cooperation currently mainly concerns the supply of energy resources to Europe, its future development could, to some extent, "push China to the sidelines."

Meanwhile, China critically needs alternative transit routes to Europe. In addition to the currently active maritime routes through the Malacca Strait, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal, the situation with the Middle Corridor becomes entirely different from that of the "Northern Route" through Russia and the potential Arctic route.

The Middle Corridor is a route on which neither Russia nor the U.S. hold key influence, while China, on the other hand, is one of the main beneficiaries of the growing transit volumes along this route. Theoretically, the U.S. could have had more direct involvement and greater influence on the Middle Corridor if American presence in Afghanistan had been maintained, but under the previous administration of Joe Biden, the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan.

The war between Russia and Ukraine has not only led to a sharp increase in transit along the Middle Corridor but has also weakened Russia's geopolitical position in the countries through which this corridor passes. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Moscow has long regarded Central Asia and the South Caucasus as part of its sphere of influence. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a ceasefire, followed by the likely achievement of long-term peace agreements on Ukraine, will free up resources for Russia and provide an opportunity to attempt to restore its influence, while also seeking to "integrate" into the Middle Corridor in order to influence this route. However, it is unlikely that this will happen through political or military pressure.

However, Russia has numerous potential opportunities to economically interest its partners, be useful for Eurasian transit, and provide its infrastructure and logistical capabilities. Additionally, Russia is making every effort to use its shared historical past to strengthen ties with the countries of the post-Soviet space. Recently, Presidents Vladimir Putin, Alexander Lukashenko, and Emomali Rahmon, during an informal meeting, held a phone conversation with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. It was agreed that the leaders of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, and Tajikistan would meet on May 9 in Moscow during the celebrations dedicated to the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Earlier, leaders such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, and Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed their participation in the celebrations. Interestingly, most of the leaders who plan to gather in Moscow on May 9, 2025, are, to varying degrees, interested in various transit projects related to the Middle Corridor.

One of the key countries facilitating transit flows along the Middle Corridor from China and Central Asia to the Atlantic and Mediterranean seas, bypassing Russia, is Georgia. This is the country through which Russia could most effectively "connect" to promising transit projects. In this regard, the logical step would be to link the Russian railway network with Georgia’s railways and the strategic transit route Baku-Tbilisi-Kars through Abkhazia. In this way, Russia would gain the shortest route "around" the Black Sea to Türkiye. On the other hand, for transit through the Middle Corridor via the South Caucasus, the opportunity to access the Russian port of Novorossiysk through the same Abkhazia is of interest. The more logistics route options and their "branches" there are, the more promising the transit direction becomes.

The Georgian opposition channel TV Pirveli recently aired a report stating that preliminary work is underway regarding the opening of railway transit from Russia to Georgia via the occupied region of Abkhazia. According to TV Pirveli, this issue is being handled by Georgia's former Prosecutor General, Otar Partskhaladze, who currently resides in Russia and has become a Russian citizen. The report also quotes one of the leaders of the "Solidarity for Peace" party, Mamuka Pipia, as saying that discussions are ongoing about opening transit through Abkhazia, addressing logistical issues, and other matters that Russia needs for the 3+3 format. Official Georgian representatives have not confirmed this information yet, but given Russia's interest in transit through Abkhazia, there is little doubt that negotiations are taking place at some level.

Russia still retains leverage over Georgia, such as its ongoing occupation of two Georgian regions—Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. In this regard, the Kremlin may combine a "stick" policy (binding the separatist regimes to itself and threatening annexation of territories) with a "carrot" approach (offering prospects for the de-occupation and reintegration of separatist territories into Georgia in some form).

The current "unyielding rhetoric" from the separatists in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali about the need for a "non-use of force agreement" is likely the "stick" approach. Russia would like to open the railway route through Abkhazia without its de-occupation. By doing so, the Kremlin signals that if Georgia remains "uncooperative," Russia could potentially escalate the situation and raise the issue of annexing the occupied territories. This is especially true since such a scenario regarding Abkhazia is strongly supported by a powerful Armenian lobby in Russia.

However, other geopolitical players, including the United States and China, despite their geopolitical rivalry, have a clear stance on the issue of Georgia's occupied territories—they are an integral part of Georgia and must be de-occupied. Türkiye and Azerbaijan are even more resolute in supporting the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity. Therefore, using the "stick" to force Georgia to compromise on its national interests and allow Russia to open a railway through Abkhazia and gain access to the Middle Corridor in the Caucasus on Moscow's terms is unlikely to succeed. A more probable outcome is that, once significant progress is made in achieving peace in Ukraine, Russia may propose more constructive options for Georgia. This could include a formula like "opening the railway transit through Abkhazia in exchange for the return of the occupied territories."

Vladimir Tskhvediani, Georgia, exclusively for Caliber.Az