What EU seeks by throwing its weight behind Azerbaijan-Armenia normalisation ... while Baku and Yerevan take quite distinctive approach

The geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus dramatically changed following the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the autumn of 2020. The landslide victory of the latter in the war reshaped the realities in the region by bringing peace, regional communications' restoration, and border demarcation to the top of the regional agenda. As Baku has been pushing to put the long-lasting ideas into action by signing a durable peace agreement and Armenia taking completely opposite measures, international actors, including the European Union (EU) jumped in to help the two neighbouring nations come to a consensus. Namely, the EU was more zealously trying to mediate the normalisation between Baku and Yerevan. However, there are still questions about the impartiality and "frankness" of the European decision-makers.

Post-war Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s position in the South Caucasus has been dramatically reshaped after the 2020 war with Armenia. The triumph in the war ushered in an all-new era for the internal and foreign policy agenda of Baku. The liberation of Azerbaijani territories from Armenian occupation raised the hopes for the final establishment of the long-awaited peace between the two neighbouring nations, which has not been achieved through diplomacy spearheaded by the Minsk Group mediation institution of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The 28-year-long shuttle diplomacy of the Minsk Group failed to abate the possibility of the Armenia-Azerbaijan escalation. President Ilham Aliyev said the main goal of the Group was to freeze the former Karabakh conflict instead of settling it over the years of mediation.

Today, Azerbaijan does not consider it necessary to involve the next European mission in settling the post-war issues. Although, Baku welcomes the EU’s attempts to mediate a normalization with Yerevan, deployment of a mission on its border, similar to that sent to Armenia, is unacceptable for the Azerbaijani authorities. President Aliyev said the internal issues of Azerbaijan should not be internationalized and Baku is not going to discuss them with any other country.

A mini-wall installed at the Fuzuli International Airport, which was built post-2020 war in Karabakh

Baku is convinced that the ongoing developments in Karabakh, including the protest action on the Lachin road, are the outcomes of Armenia’s failure to resolutely work for peace. Despite the trilateral statement signed on November 10, 2020, to end the Second Karabakh War, Yerevan has been refusing to deliver on its obligations under the document. There are still armed formations in Karabakh, which should have been withdrawn, as well as the unblocking of regional communications, including the Zangezur corridor, are standstill, despite Azerbaijan’s extensive work to realize it as soon as possible. Moreover, Armenia did not abandon its demands for so-called status and self-determination right for Karabakh Armenians.

Azerbaijan has repeatedly announced that Armenians in Karabakh, an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory, are its citizens and their rights will be granted based on the Constitution of Azerbaijan. Any talk about the fate of these people with Armenian authorities is not relevant to Baku’s government.

“We are ready to talk with Armenians who live in Karabakh, not with those who have been sent from Moscow hiding in their pockets billions of stolen money from Russian people, like a person called Vardanyan who was transferred from Moscow there with a very clear agenda. But we are ready to talk to those people in Karabakh who live there and who want to live there,” President Aliyev said.

In his other remarks, President Aliyev said necessary conditions will be created for those who want to live there under the flag of Azerbaijan in Karabakh and like all the other citizens of Azerbaijan, their rights and security will be provided. For those, who reject living as a citizen of Azerbaijan, the president’s message was clear: “whoever does not want to become our citizen, the [Lachin] road is not closed; it is open. They can leave whenever they want; no one would stop them.”

Regarding the hysteria around the Lachin road, Azerbaijani authorities adamantly reject any claim about the “blockade”. Baku says the negative statements about Azerbaijan over the situation on the highway are just another anti-Azerbaijan show.

Vehicles of the International Committee of Red Cross moving freely on the Lachin road through the territory flocked by the Azerbaijani protesters

However, strict control over the road is necessary for Azerbaijan given the numerous reports of the shipment of illegal arms and minerals, as well as the transfer of foreign agents through the road. Despite the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent along the road, Baku has been calling for more thorough control of the traffic on the highway. Because details emerged in December 2022 about the illegal visitors from Iran to Karabakh, who passed through the checkpoint on the road installed by the Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh on November 24. They were believed to have been tasked with training the criminal groups to use Iranian-made ammunition.

We, Caliber.Az, revealed in November 2022 that the Russian peacekeepers have been supplying weapons to the Armenian separatists through the Lachin road under the disguise of “peacekeeping humanitarian aid."

The list of the arms transferred to the zone of temporary responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping mission included anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, automatic small arms, including easel machine guns, sniper rifles, 122mm mortars, ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) “Fagot” (10 units), ATGM “Cornet” (10 units), grenade launchers, portable communication devices, and ammunition. The peacekeepers have reportedly delivered weapons and ammunition from the Russian 102nd military base located in the Armenian city of Gyumri via the Lachin highway.

Such facts raised eyebrows among the Azerbaijani public and authorities about the activities of the temporary Russian peacekeeping contingent in Karabakh. There is a growing belief that the operation of the contingent is insufficient and there should be joint checkpoints on the Lachin road to prevent its abuse for criminal purposes. Furthermore, Baku may consider the activation of the article of the trilateral statement from November 10, 2020, about the termination of the Russian peacekeeping mission after 2025, when its five-year mandate ends.

Armenia – a double agent

Meanwhile, there is quite a complex situation in Armenia for the international actors, namely the EU amidst efforts to condemn Azerbaijan for the Lachin road events for winning the trust of Armenia for draining Russia’s influence. For instance, there are rising sentiments in the country against the Russian military presence and overall Russian influence in the country which could play into the EU’s hands. Yerevan’s relations with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military bloc, of which it is a member, soured since September 2022 following the border clashes with Azerbaijan. Back then, the Armenian government urged an immediate intervention by CSTO, but the organisation turned it down as unnecessary. It has led to Armenia’s gradual drifting from the military alliance and as a result, Nikol Pashinyan’s government rejected on January 10 to host CSTO drills on Armenian soils. Pashinyan even said the military presence of Russia in Armenia threatens the security of his country given their lack of response to Yerevan’s requests.

With all these at hand, Yerevan is now seeking a durable European mission on its border with Azerbaijan to examine the tensions with its eastern neighbour, including the events on the Lachin corridor and the Karabakh issue, despite its heavy security reliance on Russia. Moscow’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has recently said that although a Russian mission was offered to jump in, Yerevan’s hardline position quelled it. Earlier, a mission from Europe was deployed on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in October-December 2022 and was later replaced by a transitional planning assistance team. Armenia is seemingly attempting to wean off Russia’s long-lasting dominance by attracting Moscow’s adversaries.

Protesters in Yerevan demand Russia's withdrawal from Armenia

However, the ongoing anti-Russia developments in the smallest country of the South Caucasus cannot go without intersecting with the facts behind the scenes. Armenia is widely known as one of Russia’s closest allies. The mutual defence pact with Moscow has long established Russian military presence through thousands of troops deployed to permanent bases in the country, close to the borders with Türkiye, Georgia, and Iran. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) oversees the border, and Russian state-owned companies operate Armenian railways and a number of other strategic sectors.

Currently, the strong intertwining with Russia prevents Armenia from taking practical steps to settle down the situation on the Lachin road with Azerbaijan as an explicit sign of reluctance to disturb Russia-installed Ruben Vardanyan in Karabakh. There was a “silence of lambs” in Armenia when Vardanyan, a tycoon known for his closeness to Vladimir Putin, left Moscow for Karabakh four months ago. And today, Vardanyan is free to use regular bellicose rhetoric against Azerbaijan amidst the Pashinyan administration’s silence, which undermines the attempts for peace with Baku. He is yet to be convened to Yerevan for consultations over his separatist statements.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Russian counterpart Mikhail Mishustin

Furthermore, in May 2021, the Armenian government agreed to allocate 3.5 hectares of land in the Syunik province for deploying the border forces of FSB. Back then, Pashinyan said two new strongholds of the 102nd Russian military base were created in Syunik and this was an additional security guarantee for Syunik and the entire Armenian territory. In November of the same year, Yerevan signed a deal with Russia’s nuclear operator Rosatom to extend the lifespan of the Soviet-era Metsamor nuclear power plant until 2026. Rosatom is expected to assist Armenia in the plant’s renewal for extra 10 years after 2026.

Entrance of the 102nd Russian base in Gyumri, Armenia

Moreover, sometime in 2022, Russian entrepreneur Roman Trotsenko took over the over the Zangezur Copper and Molybdenum Combine, one of the strategic mineral processing facilities in Armenia. Back then, Pashinyan said negotiations were underway with Russia to support a new copper smelter through nuclear power at the Zangezur plant.

Now, the EU is seemingly miscalculating the outcomes of deeper involvement in Armenia amidst its increasing appetite to lure the South Caucasus nation against the backdrop of Russia's troubles in Ukraine. European political mega brains think Armenia can easily abandon its strong bonds with Russia, but the facts on the ground and Moscow's decades-long heavy influence on the smallest country of the region, as well as Yerevan's double game, can backfire anytime.