Frozen alliances: Armenia's uncertain path between Russia and the West Expert insights

Armenia will not "unfreeze" its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2025, as reported by the country's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS). "It is unlikely that the reasons for freezing Armenia's membership in the CSTO will disappear in 2025," the report stated. The FIS clarified that it will continue to question the authority of this security structure.

Previously, Armenia's Minister of Defence, Suren Papikyan, stated that Armenia is interested in maintaining high-level relations with Russia. Papikyan noted that Armenia does not participate de facto in the CSTO, but the republic has not cancelled any bilateral agreements with Russia nor withdrawn from the organization.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), despite the statement from Armenia's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), still considers the republic its ally. This was reported by a source in the organization to TASS. "Yes, the organization's Secretariat is aware of this statement from the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Republic of Armenia. However, we still consider Armenia an ally and continue to interact with Yerevan in a working mode," the information stated.

Earlier, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Yerevan had frozen its participation in the CSTO's activities. Armenia's Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan, stated that Yerevan is assessing all risks regarding the decision to withdraw from the CSTO. However, Armenia has not made any concrete decisions on this matter.

In February 2024, Armenia announced the "freezing" of its membership in the CSTO and later refused to pay membership dues to the organization. In June 2024, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that the next "logical step" for Armenia in its relations with the CSTO would be to withdraw from the organization, pointing to the approaching "point of no return" in this regard.

A few months later, in early December, the Armenian prime minister declared that Yerevan was not vetoing any CSTO documents, as it considers itself outside the organization. "We said we were freezing our participation in the CSTO's activities, and that means we are not involved in the discussion of any documents," the Armenian leader clarified while addressing the parliament of the republic.

How should one interpret these puzzling manoeuvres? If Armenia has long since chosen to pivot towards the West, why not initiate the process of leaving the CSTO? What does this "freezing-unfreezing" membership behaviour in the CSTO resemble? Are Armenia’s authorities acting out of fear, or are they expecting to gain some benefits through these strategic shifts?

These questions were explored by prominent political analysts for Caliber.Az.

Russian political analyst and founder of the expert-analytical network PolitRUS, Vitaly Arkov, pointed out that, in line with the "longstanding tradition" of Armenia's political elite, Pashinyan’s regime is attempting to sit on multiple chairs at once.

"In Yerevan, this is called a multivector foreign policy, but in reality, it’s the trickery of a rogue, which can be succinctly described by one not-so-euphonious but accurate term — cunning. In other words, Pashinyan and Co. are convinced that Yerevan is of great value to Moscow, Tehran, Brussels, Paris, and Washington, and therefore, there is a reason to 'play off' all of them.

Full NATO membership is ‘out of reach’ for Armenia. Back in June of the previous year, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, following a meeting of NATO defence ministers, directly stated that the Alliance has no intention of further expansion ‘in the near future’: ‘I don't see any desire or indication, you know, that we will pursue expansion at any point in the near future.’ At the same time, Lloyd Austin remarked: ‘I suspect that there will always be countries that will want to join NATO.’

It’s unlikely that Yerevan’s statements about aspiring to join NATO can be considered genuine desires. However, this is also true for most other statements made by representatives of Pashinyan’s regime," the analyst said.

However, according to Arkov, it seems that NATO has found a role for Armenia within the Alliance.

"According to one of the points of the recently concluded so-called strategic partnership charter with the U.S. in Washington, Armenia commits to participate in peacekeeping missions under NATO’s aegis. The world knows what NATO’s 'peacekeeping' really means. The residents of the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya... are particularly familiar with NATO’s 'peacekeeping.' Thus, Armenia is being assigned the role of a 'cannon fodder' supplier for military aggressions against countries and foreign occupation forces that are unfavored by the U.S. and NATO. Given Washington and Brussels' statements regarding Tehran, Armenia could be used in a potential war against Iran...

Some might argue that Lloyd Austin is a representative of the outgoing team of Joseph Biden, and with the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the Pentagon’s position on this issue might change. There is a possibility. However, considering Trump’s interest in rebuilding relations with Vladimir Putin and agreeing to the Kremlin’s condition that even Ukraine would be denied NATO membership, it’s hard to imagine that the White House would simultaneously pull Armenia into the Alliance, even ahead of Georgia, which has been knocking on NATO’s door for years.

The non-provision of full NATO membership to Armenia does not mean that the Alliance will cut all ties with it. On the contrary, NATO's presence in the region will continue to strengthen — through various cover schemes, much to the delight of Armenia’s money-hungry Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, his wife Anna Hakobyan, and his closest entourage. The 'partnership' between Armenia's Armed Forces and other NATO armies requires preparation. Therefore, we are already seeing joint exercises with the U.S., such as Eagle Partner. The West is already allocating financial 'assistance' for retraining Armenian soldiers, a significant portion of which is traditionally embezzled by the country's leadership.

This also implies a shift from Soviet and Russian weaponry to arms produced by NATO countries. Armenia lacks the funds to purchase these weapons. Therefore, part of the 'aid' will come in the form of obsolete stockpiles from NATO’s arsenals, and for the purchase of still serviceable equipment, loans will be provided," the expert said.

According to Arkov, the Pashinyan regime understands that in the event of a military conflict with Azerbaijan, NATO will not intervene, as Armenia is not covered by Article 5 of the alliance's treaty.

"Moreover, the events of the autumn of 2020 are still fresh in memory, when none of Armenia's so-called Western partners intervened in the war with Azerbaijan — they only expressed routine regrets and calls for a ceasefire.

Since Yerevan is actively obstructing the process of signing a peace treaty with Baku, not fulfilling its commitments to unblock all economic and transport links, and continuing military provocations, there is a high likelihood that Moscow's peace mediation, as a CSTO ally, may soon be needed again. This is one side of the situation.

On the other hand, it has been clearly communicated to Yerevan that the profits mainly enjoyed by the representatives of the Pashinyan regime from economic projects and effectively forgiven loans from the Eurasian Development Bank within the framework of the EAEU, as well as export-import operations circumventing anti-Russian sanctions, are directly linked to Armenia's membership in the CSTO and the presence of the 102nd Russian military base on its territory.

The West, however, offers nothing comparable in terms of enrichment for Armenia's ruling elite in exchange for a complete break with Russia. And even if it makes promises, it will ultimately deceive them, as there are plenty of sad examples to prove this," Arkov concluded.

Political analyst and lecturer at Baku State University, Sultan Zahidov, believes that to understand the reasons behind Armenia's political manoeuvres, it is necessary to consider some historical context regarding Armenia’s relations with Russia and the CSTO.

"As we all know, Armenia's pivot to the West began not after the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but immediately after Pashinyan came to power in 2018. At that time, he openly stated the need to move closer to the West and began pursuing a certain anti-Russian policy. It was then that Pashinyan ordered the arrest of Armenian General Yuri Khachaturov, who was the Secretary-General of the CSTO. His stance clearly indicated Armenia's initial attempts to distance itself from Russia. Since Pashinyan's rise to power was supported by the West, he began to take into account directives from certain Western political circles, which ultimately led to the deterioration of relations with Russia.

This position of Armenia persisted during and after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, when Russia's non-intervention in the military clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan provided grounds for Armenia to accuse the CSTO of inaction and thus declare its intention to freeze Armenia's participation in the organization. Pashinyan repeatedly blamed the CSTO for its inaction and stated that Armenia's main mistake had been relying too much on Russia for its security. Therefore, Yerevan now needed to diversify its security guarantees. As the next logical step, Pashinyan began signing military cooperation agreements with countries such as France, India, and Greece, and acquired offensive lethal weapons, paving the way for an arms race in the South Caucasus.

Notably, Armenia's pro-Western orientation and its efforts to militarize could create certain problems for Pashinyan. First and foremost, militarization, which leads to an arms race with Azerbaijan, creates what is known as a security dilemma in the South Caucasus, threatening the stability and security architecture of the entire region.

Secondly, militarization hinders the peace process and normalization with Azerbaijan, as official Baku cannot be certain of Yerevan's true intentions.

Thirdly, it exacerbates relations with the Kremlin, which disapproves of the presence of Western military infrastructure and forces in the South Caucasus. Finally, allocating such a large sum of money to military needs will further harm Armenia's economy. According to Armenia's Minister of Finance Vahe Hovhannisyan, the country's military budget for 2025 will be around $1.7 billion, which is a significant amount considering the existing socio-economic challenges in Armenia," warns the political analyst.

Referring to a recent report from Armenia's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), which indicates that the country is unlikely to resume its participation in the CSTO in 2025, and considering the outcomes of a recent meeting between Armenia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan and Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, the political analyst concludes that Armenia and Russia continue to maintain a good level of relations.

“The trade turnover data for 2024 ($12 billion) between these countries supports my argument. However, Pashinyan stated in the summer that Armenia will ultimately withdraw from the CSTO, and his government has recently approved a project for Armenia's accession to the EU, which, according to some Russian officials, contradicts Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.

Thus, it can be concluded that, on the one hand, Armenia intends to reduce its dependence on Russia by attempting to accelerate its integration with the West, while on the other hand, Pashinyan is reluctant to take drastic steps, such as fully withdrawing from the CSTO, and does not want to worsen relations with Moscow. Armenia finds itself between a rock and a hard place, where both scenarios—whether a pro-Russian or pro-European orientation—could present certain challenges for Yerevan. I believe that Pashinyan has a clear intention to integrate Armenia more with the West, but he also takes into account Russia's frustration with the growing Western presence in the region and the fact that Armenia’s dependence on Russia in areas such as the economy, energy, and security cannot be eliminated overnight. 

For many years, Armenia, which many considered a puppet state of Russia, went through the process of so-called 'Finlandization,' where foreign policy, economy, energy, and other spheres of Yerevan were fully controlled by the Russian political-economic establishment. Now, to reduce this dependency, Armenia will have to make considerable efforts, also considering the fact that Russia does not want to lose its influence in the country. Therefore, Pashinyan may be waiting for the emergence of a new geopolitical landscape in the region, which could occur, especially after the Russia-Ukraine war, potentially leading to the weakening of the Kremlin. Until that happens, Yerevan's policy will likely be based on the principle of a weathercock, meaning that the position will often change depending on the situation.

But what is important here is that regardless of Pashinyan's choice of political orientation, security and development in the South Caucasus require Yerevan to extend its hand to both Azerbaijan and Türkiye. To do this, Pashinyan needs to fulfil Azerbaijan's demands regarding changes to Armenia's Constitution, the withdrawal of third parties from the conditional border, and the acceleration of the peace process. Without signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, along with strengthening trust between the parties and unblocking borders and lines of communication, the prospects for long-term security and development in the South Caucasus will remain unclear," said Zahidov.